Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons by Bhumitra Chakma

Author:Bhumitra Chakma [Chakma, Bhumitra]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Ethnic Studies, Social Science, Political Science, Regional Studies, General
ISBN: 9781134132546
Google: XTbOO0gVgR0C
Goodreads: 17015113
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2010-07-27T00:00:00+00:00

7 Proliferation Control Challenges, Nuclear Terrorism, and Pakistan

[T]he networks … may now have grown so extensive as to have acquired a life of their own, independent of the original Pakistani sponsors.

The Guardian1

[E]ven in the unlikely scenario that Dr A. Q. Khan made the trade independently, it does not absolve the Pakistani state of the responsibility of safeguarding its nuclear technologies.

Gaurav Kampani, CNS2

It was no less than a staged-drama. On 4 February 2004, Dr A. Q. Khan, who is popularly known as the ‘father’ of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, appeared on the state-run Pakistan Television and in a monotonous voice apologized to the people of Pakistan for transferring nuclear know-how, equipment, and materials to other countries. He said:

[M]any of the reported activities did occur … at my behest … which were based in good faith but on errors of judgment. I wish to place on record that … there was never ever any kind of authorization for these activities by an [sic] Government official.3

The next day, President General Pervez Musharraf, using the reason of Khan’s immense contribution to national security, pardoned the scientist. Interestingly, the President insisted that only A. Q. Khan and his associates were involved in the nuclear technology transfer and that ‘no Pakistani government or its army has ever been involved in any kind of nuclear proliferation’.4 Then, Khan was put under house arrest and eventually, in a rather questionable way, the Pakistani government announced the case ‘closed’ in May 2006.5

Indeed, the episode was the culmination of mounting worldwide allegations against the Pakistani metallurgist about his involvement in proliferation activities and the outcome of an official enquiry launched by the Pakistani authorities in late 2003. In October 2002, US intelligence agencies discovered a clandestine North Korean uranium-enrichment plant, which Pyongyang had built with substantial ‘foreign assistance’, and American officials alleged that Pakistan had provided this assistance to North Korea.6 Islamabad, however, denied the charge. In August 2003, Tehran admitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the centrifuges of its uranium-enrichment plant were of foreign origin.7 More stunningly, Libya informed the US, the UK, and the IAEA in late 2003 that A. Q. Khan and his associates had provided centrifuge machinery, components, technology, servicing facilities, training to the Libyans in how to operate centrifuges, and even bomb design to assist Libya in its drive to build nuclear weapons.8 These revelations forced the Pakistani government to launch an official investigation into Khan’s proliferation activities.

Against the backdrop of the Khan drama, the debate about the implications of new, small nuclear powers for international security and for tackling the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation in the second nuclear age has been rekindled. Almost universally the whole episode was viewed as a ‘staged-drama’,9 and observers generally expressed doubt about the official claim that no Pakistani government or its army was involved in proliferation activities.10 Such a disclaimer rather provoked deep suspicion about the role of the Pakistan government in Khan’s proliferation activities. The general view in the West regarding the Khan affair is that such transfers of know-how, technology, etc.

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